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ABSTRACT: In this essay I raise difficulties for both speculative realism and 
speculative materialism, both fashionable stances. I do not argue against 
realism or materialism as such, but I suggest that in both cases a more precise 
delineation of what is meant by ‘speculative’ would be beneficial. I discuss 
speculative realism in part one and speculative materialism in part two, and 
then add a brief conclusion in part three. 
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I 
In contemporary continental philosophy speculative realism is associated with: 
• a reassertion of the autonomy of reality and realism (without solving the 
epistemological problems so raised) and a rejection of the primacy of 
epistemology and any other form of what Quentin Meillassoux calls 
correlationism 
• the claim that reality does not depend on thought or on human beings 
and needs to be rethought in philosophy without privileging the human 
relation to reality of any other form of anthropocentrism 
• a re-engagement with the natural sciences and a rejection of any 
nature/culture dualism 
• cosmological atheism for which both humanity and the earth are 
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cosmically irrelevant and everything is subject to radical caprice 
This turn arises from the recognition that continental philosophy based on anti-
realism, hermeneutics and the analysis of texts may be exhausted.1 Speculative 
philosophy of this sort acknowledges its dependence on extra-philosophical 
conditions. It re-envisages philosophy as a general inquiry which is not 
restricted to human realities, language or texts.  The contemporary speculative 
philosophers all react against neo-Kantian transcendentalism and reject both 
Kantian correlationism and the notion that reality can be reduced to thought.2 
They then attempt to upstage the rest of the culture from a position of hieratic 
ascent. This raises the issue of whether it really is possible to dismiss Kantian 
transcendentalism so easily, and the related problem of what account of 
immanence would then be required. 
It is possible to evade these issues by claiming that speculative realism is 
merely a label for diverse positions. This is largely true, but it remains the case 
that a turn back to metaphysics requires some account of how the main 
objections to metaphysics are to be overcome. Here the term ‘speculative’ is 
chronically ambiguous. There is no coherent conception of the speculative in 
these philosophers’ works, apart from the notion that it is important to 
speculate about the nature of reality in the light of the natural sciences, and 
even to produce weird models of reality, a thesis widely accepted by physicists. 
Yet the term speculative has a long and distinguished history in philosophy, not 
least in the modern writings of Kant, Schlegel and Hegel. In this history there is 
a crucial distinction between speculative in the sense of a wide view (from 
specula lookout) and speculative in the sense of truth known in an unreal and 
inverted form but with some reliability (from speculum, mirror).3 That is, a 
strong conception of speculative will theorise the speculative as imaginary and 
distorted, and also allow for features which precludes theoreticity. In addition, 
 
1 Major works associated with the speculative turn include Ray Brassier, Iain Hamilton Grant, Graham 
Harman and Quentin Meillassoux, ‘Speculative Realism’ in Collapse Volume III: Unknown Deleuze (London: 
Urbanomic, 2007), pp. 307-450;  Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman eds. The Speculative Turn: 
Continental Materialism and Realism. (Melbourne: re.press, (2011) and Paul J. Ennis, Continental Realism. 
(Winchester, UK: Zero Books, 2011). 
2 Here there is a partial return to Schelling with his emphasis on the primacy of unprethinkable being. 
3 For excellent discussion of the term ‘speculative’ in the history of Western philosophy, seethe entry 
‘Spekulation’ in J. Ritter and K. Grűnder eds. Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1995) band 9, pp. 1355-1370. 
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a strong theory of speculative will explain both the peculiar logic required to 
explain the speculative and how it reshapes human beings and their cultures.4 
Hegel’s famous speculative philosophy did all these things and included both a 
theory of the proposition, an account of speculation as an emergent shape of 
consciousness, and a theory of emergent speculative thinking as pure thinking 
evident to itself. 
 In the work of the contemporary so-called speculative philosophers, in 
contrast, the term ‘speculative’ does relatively little work.5 There is also no 
common philosophy uniting Ray Brassier, Graham Harman, Quentin 
Meillassoux and Iain Hamilton Grant, let alone the maestri from whom they 
draw: Alain Badiou, Giles Deleuze, Francoise Laruelle, Bruno Latour, Isabelle 
Stengers. Indeed, in many current discourses the speculative turn functions as a 
self-promotional myth. Transcendental physics, object-oriented philosophy, 
abstract materialism and eliminative materialism may all have speculative 
elements, but they are different. The materialism of these philosophers is also 
often equivocal. Once it is argued that materialism is not about matter as 
substance or a substratum, that material reality is non-all, that materialism 
applies both to nature and to ideas, that materialism is only a dependency or a 
procedure, then the ground ceded makes the term ‘materialist’ largely 
stipulative. Overall, it is fair to suggest that no coherent account of speculative 
realism is extant, despite the world wide vogue with which this term is 
associated. 
II 
I now turn to the speculative materialism of the great German Jewish Marxist 
philosopher Ernst Bloch, (1885-1977), which is currently receiving renewed 
 
4 Cf Andrew Taggart, “On the Need for Speculative Philosophy Today’ in Cosmos and History, vol. 8, no 1 
(2012): 47-61. 
5Wesley Phillips argues that speculative realism has misplaced speculation See W. Phillips, ‘The Future of 
Speculation’ in Cosmos and History, vol. 8, no 1 (2012): 289-302, p. 290. Phillips rightly argues that the 
speculative realists tend to fall below the level of Hegel and Schelling. Instead of setting German Idealism 
on its feet and inheriting its attempt to go beyond any subject-object dualism, they return to the 
externalism of eighteenth century French materialism in some respects. 
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attention.6 Bloch’s speculative materialism is set out in his Das 
Materialismusproblem Seine Geschichte und Substanz (1972) and Experimentum Mundi 
Frage, Kategorien des Herausbringens, Praxis (1975), both texts which have not been 
translated into English. 
Following Marx, Bloch insists that materialism must be active, qualitative 
and praxis-oriented, not contemplative and passive or associated, as it largely is 
in capitalist cultures, with inorganic stuff, pessimism and resignation. 
Materialism, for Bloch, means the explanation of the world from itself, not an 
attempt to close the possibility content of reality by resort to premature 
ontological characterisations.7 Further, against all deflationary materialism, 
Bloch argues for a materialism which thinks utopia and matter, together. 
According to Bloch materialism needs to be expanded to take account of what 
is becoming possible in reality and of real anticipation in the form of utopian 
function  and pre-appearance (Vor-Schein),  both in the physical universe and in 
socio-cultural materials. In this context Bloch proposes instead a new speculative 
materialism: that is a materialism with immanent horizon (speculari), a 
qualitative materialism which takes the history of materialism in new directions. 
In Das Materialismusproblem Bloch provides the most original history of 
materialism that we have. The history of philosophical concepts of matter, he 
argues, illustrates the paradox that it is often the idealists who are the best 
teachers from whom to learn what matter is, just as it is the materialists who are 
the best teachers from whom to learn about thought.8 In the same way, Bloch 
recognizes that it is necessary to challenge the Eurocentric biases of the 
standard discussions of materialism and to take account of non-European 
materials. Hence he devotes a major study to Avicenna and the speculative 
matter concept of the Aristotelian Left.9 According to Bloch Aristotle 
distinguished between being-according-to-possibility (kata to dynaton) and being-
in-possibility (dynamei on). However, under the influence of Avicebron's doctrine 
 
6 For a perceptive comparison between Bloch’s speculative materialism and contemporary speculative 
realism, see C. Moir, ‘Beyond the Turn: Ernst Bloch and the Future of Speculative Materialism’ in Poetics 
Today, vol. 37, no 2 (June 2016): 328-351. 
7 Das Materialismusproblem-Seine Geschichte und Substanz (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1972) p.446. 
8 Das Materialismusproblem-Seine Geschichte und Substanz op.cit. pp. 129-130. 
9 See Ernst Bloch, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Left trs. L. Goldman and P. Thompson (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2019). 
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of universal matter, Bloch claims that the Aristotelian Left, especially Avicenna 
and Averroes, interpreted the forms as material. Hence for the Aristotelian 
Left, matter became self creative, active and form-laden, a fermenting womb 
which produces new contents as it develops. Against the bulk of the Marxist 
tradition, Bloch adopts this dynamic activist concept of matter. He rejects 
traditional materialism as distorted by ontological stasis.  Bloch also emphasises 
that materialism cannot passively take over the ontology of the natural sciences 
'abstraction' of the modern natural sciences because they are based on an 
abstract and alienated relationship to nature.10 Rather materialists must correct 
their valid but delimited perspectives with the warm streams of Renaissance 
and Romantic naturalism, including, following Engels, Oken's theosophical 
nature philosophy. 11In Bloch’s system matter is not confined to what is at 
hand: it is the womb of possibilities, uncompleted entelechy, activist forward 
matter that dialectically develops new contents as the process unfolds. 
In developing a new concept of matter, Bloch follows the Boehme-
Schelling-von Hartmann problematic and posits an objectively unsolved 
material prius.  Like Schelling, Bloch models a process which begins with a 
ground which is a nonground (Ungrund), a state of imperfection, characterised 
by lack and will-like drive to what it lacks. That which exists is not 'irrational', 
but it is 'a-rational', in the technical sense that its 'thatness' cannot be reduced 
to logical ideas. It is intensive, tensional and tendential.  Existing reality is will-
like (dasshaft), in the sense that it has an assertive, striving, directional character. 
It is defined by an intensive relation, present throughout, between the That and 
the What. For Bloch the process does not begin with a ground in which 
everything is present in potentia, but with a That-ground (Dassgrund) with only 
That-being (Dass-sein), an 'empty', 'dark', 'objectively vague' 'nullpoint' of all 
being, an undetermined x, which because it has not come to be, functions as 
active lack or directed negation, an objective 'not' in the material cause, both 
the 'establishing factor' (Setzungsfaktor), which sets up the process, and the 
 
10Ernst Bloch, Heritage of Our Times trs. Neville and Stephen Plaice (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1991) pp. 254-298. 
11 Here Bloch is closer to Marx than most readers suspect. As Bloch points out, Marx characterised 
matter in Boehmean terms as 'drive' (Trieb), 'life spirit' (Lebensgeist), 'tension' (Spannkraft), and 'torment' 
(Qμal). 
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'realising factor', which drives it forward. The unmediated still within itself of 
being, which does not yet possess itself (sich nicht hat), 'has not yet driven itself 
out of itself,' the subjective or active causal factor (Dass-Subjekt, das Subjekthafte), 
the a-logical driving force (Dass-Antrieb, Dass-Anstoss) or insisting factor (incitare, 
Insistieren-im-Werdensein, the agens of material being: 
What occurs in itself and unmediated as the now, is therefore still empty. The 
That in the now is hollow, is only at first undetermined, as a fermenting not. As 
the not with which everything begins and establishes itself, around which every 
'something' is still built.12 
The That in the moment is a 'not having'; it is the 'not there' of a something 
which drives forward to what it lacks as the lack of something and the flight 
from this lack. The That operates as nisus or exigency: as a simple x, an alpha 
incomplete and unobjective in itself, the not-there of each present moment, 
which is still veiled to itself.   
Bloch’s matter is processual: an active substratum of developing possibilities 
with dynamei on. Hence matter is not exhausted by what has already come to be. 
Instead, Bloch develops a futurological materialism for which reality still has its 
essence before it as an open system, not only in the sense of a system which 
allows for new contents still to come, but in the sense of a system which takes 
such new contents as intrinsic to the character of the world, and attempts to 
rethink the fundamental categories of philosophy as a result. Bloch posits an 
experimental world of developing open coherences, the laws and structure of 
which change as it develops. There is no settled substratum, in which 
everything is contained in potentia; no already finished substance, no concluded 
entelechy, or decided essence; no fixed world spheres; no concluded 
specification of nature; and no subordination of details to a decided pattern of 
arrangement.  
Bloch’s speculative materialism also implies a futurological logic. Bloch 
breaks with Leibniz's principle of identity according to which what emerges in 
the predicate is present in the logical subject (praedicatum inest subjecto) and argues 
that S is not yet P, subject is not yet predicate. Further, Bloch addresses the 
crucial issue of modern nominalism and argues for a new primacy of 
particulars in materialism which takes account of aporiae and antinomies 
 
12 Ernst Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffung (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1954-5), p.356. 
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between particulars and universals which cannot be currently resolved. 
Further, Bloch addresses the crucial issue of modern nominalism and argues for 
a new primacy of particulars in materialism which takes account of aporiae and 
antinomies between particulars and universals which cannot be currently 
resolved. 
Bloch's materialism also implies an activist conception of metaphysics.13 As 
constitutive imagination (Phantasie) which interprets the world in terms of ideas 
which have no 'place' in it (u-topia), it is philosophy as theory of  what needs to be 
which mobilises optatives and suppositionals: concrete philosophical architecture, 
which represents the world as open to the possibility of concrete utopia. But 
this conception of activist metaphysics transforms what metaphysics has 
traditionally been taken to be. Consistent with this transformation of 
metaphysics into a metaphysics of the good 'meta' which the world contains, 
Bloch's metaphysics has no ontology of a traditional sort. It is based on hope as 
the principle or source of its final metaphysical grade.  It is a metaphysics forwards, 
for which the real is not located ante rem, an immanentist-transcendentalist 
metaphysics which links human subjective experience of fulfilment with a 
finalism of the object. Here Bloch anticipates more recent anti-mentalist 
accounts of thought and consciousness by arguing, following Abelard's 
conformitas, that the logical in human consciousness can find what corresponds 
to it in the world. Bloch's aim is to overcome the traditional dualisms between 
spirit and matter, thinking and being, reason and sensuousness, and to insist, in 
the spirit of Schelling, that the subject belongs to the world. 
Bloch makes matter the whole of reality, not merely the manifest forms that 
currently appear, and then makes process central to matter, and so replaces 
static ontology with a radical emphasis on change. Most contemporary 
materialisms, in contrast, are still staticist. Despite bows to process philosophy 
and Whitehead, there is relatively little in the literature on how process 
modifies materialism. Bloch, in contrast, shows that materialism can be 
strengthened by being rethought in genetic terms. Like Schelling, Bloch posits a 
process in which matter comes to be, and of which human life is a part. For 
him human life and consciousness are also material: there is no dualism 
 
  13 For an overview of Bloch’s political metaphysics, see my The Marxist Philosophy of Ernst Bloch (London: 
Macmillan, 1982) especially ch.s 3 and 4. 
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between matter and consciousness or thought, as was largely the case in French 
materialism.  
Again, Bloch makes matter open to the new, with the result that matter 
becomes a futurological concept: what matter will be. In this way Bloch adds a 
new dimension to materialism. Here Bloch’s materialism has the potential to 
provide model ideas for a future philosophy of physics which draws from 
Spinoza and Schelling precisely because it does not confuse present process 
forms with nature, natura naturans with natura naturata, the noumenal with the 
process forms which appear. 14 
All this amounts to a conception of matter with no precedent in the Marxist 
tradition. Bloch’s matter has futurological features. For Bloch, there is a 
direction giving principle in matter, at least as a placeholder to which no 
content is yet adequate. Matter is form-laden and contains an energetic drive 
(Formtrieb) to higher forms, based on the driving tendency and entelechtic 
latency of the process. The whole of matter is open to developing finality and 
has an invariant direction towards entelechy which is not yet. For Bloch matter 
is not without direction and structure. Rather Logikon is an attribute of matter.15 
Bloch's speculative materialism is problematic, however, because it remains 
to some extent within an Aristotelian teleological framework as well as close to 
a form of subject-object identity influenced by Schelling. Bloch’s materialism 
also lacks adequate methodological controls. Bloch’s maximalism subverts the 
negativity or disillusion which is part of the force of a coherent materialism, 
and tends to include counterfactual materials within process matter. Again, 
materialism is usually taken to imply a prevalence of what is actual now. 
However, Bloch's ‘materialism forwards' means that the world is explained in 
 
14 Here Bloch’s work has been taken up and extended in the transcendental materialism of the German 
physicist Rainer Zimmerman and by Bloch’s son, Jan Robert Bloch. The term ‘transcendental’ here refers 
to the fact that the cosmological model is based on positing a primal ground which transcends space and 
time. This primal ground is alleged to explain the character of reality as process- like, tendential and in 
need of completion. See R. E. Zimmermann, Subjekt und Existenz. Zur Systematik Blochscher Philosophie (Berlin: 
Philo, 2001) and ‘Natursubjekt’ in Beat Dietschy, Doris Zeilinger, and Rainer Zimmermann (eds.). Bloch-
Wörterbuch: Leitbegriffe der Philosophie Ernst Blochs (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012) pp.374-403. 
15 These claims are advanced in an accessible form in the collection Tendenz-Latenz-Utopie (Frankfurt a.  
M.: Suhrkamp, 1978). Johan Siebers is now working to refine our understanding of Bloch’s central 
categories. See his entries in Beat Dietschy, Doris Zeilinger, and Rainer Zimmermann eds. Bloch-
Wörterbuch: Leitbegriffe der Philosophie Ernst Blochs op.cit pp. 242-247, 403-412, 412-416, 582-589. 
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important respects by what is 'not yet' and still future. Again, materialism is 
usually thought to imply objective limitations on hope. So far from accepting 
that the world lacks meaning, Bloch argues that the meaning of history has a 
worldly basis, even though it has first to be built.  Bloch's equation of matter 
with developing real possibility, with matter open to the Novum, reduces the 
power of the actual to negate human hope to the point where one might argue 
that it is possible to think too highly of matter. Bloch’s materialism also fails to 
include an account of human embodiment. It is also very short on technical 
social or economic analyses. As a result, it is fair to conclude that Bloch does 
not show that matter is defined in his system with sufficient precision for it to be 
the bearer of his utopian hopes, while the speculative immanent horizon he 
explores requires sharper specification if it is to be integrated with a form of 
materialism. Of course, it may be unreasonable to ask a utopian philosopher to 
justify his or her utopian perspectives by reference solely to the reality at hand. 
The point of utopian philosophy is to alert us to the possibility that central 
features of the reality at hand may be defeasible. Bloch’s achievement is to 
reassert a speculative utopian challenge to whatever in existing reality is 
inadequate to human hope and to offer an horizon in which Marx’s 
naturalisation of man and humanisation of nature may come to be realised. 
Here, as elsewhere, Bloch envisages a profound engagement with both nature 
and technology of the kind that Western Marxists largely failed to envisage. 
III 
Both so-called speculative realism and Bloch’s speculative materialism are 
attempts to escape from the distortions imposed on Western thought by neo-
Kantianism. In both cases there is a return to metaphysics. In both cases, the 
fact that the way we imagine the world to be has causal effects is taken 
seriously. In both cases the philosophical power of imagination and thinking 
otherwise are re-valiorised against neo-Kantian school philosophy, to use the 
German expression. In both cases, however, the term ‘speculative’ is a stand in 
for analytical work that needs to be done. The so-called speculative realists do 
not provide ‘speculation’ in the strong German sense, and remain closer to 
current common sense than they pretend. None of them faces the productivity 
of fiction and mythology in the coming to be of the world. Against Romantic 
excess, they offer argumentation and even at times analytical rigour. 
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Nonetheless, most analytical philosophers are not convinced. Nor do these 
philosophers resort to higher logics or category theory, even though both might 
make their claims more persuasive, both to professionals and to the wider 
audience that reads continental philosophy. 
Bloch the utopian philosopher is arguably more realistic in crucial respects. 
He does not show, however, that the immanent horizon he finds is immanent, 
but only that various data could be so construed in terms of an immanent 
horizon if we assume a single world process with directionality. Current science 
and philosophy, however, do not provide uncontested support for either 
assumption. This is not fatal to Bloch’s position because his utopianism aims to 
inspire praxis that leads to the conditions needed for the realisation of the 
utopian indications to which he refers. However, a philosophy of immanence 
must be able to specify what immanence  entails, and this cannot be done 
simply by ruling out’ transcendence’ or the causal activity of supernatural 
beings. Bloch himself understood this, and probably believed that a qualitative 
materialism could meet such demands for criteria-based coherence. It is not 
clear, however, that he strengthened his position by arguing for speculative 
materialism since materialism loses coherent definition if it cannot set limits to 
what in the long term future matter might be. Bloch’s turn to the speculative 
deepened his utopian philosophy in several respects, but it needed much clearer 
specification if it was to be reconciled with a coherent form of materialism, a 
materialism going beyond the philosophically loose dicta of Marx, Engels and 
Lenin. 
Put differently, a more coherent notion of ‘speculative’ would contribute to 
the program of speculative philosophy which current philosophy arguably 
needs. There is almost certainly a need for a form of speculative philosophy 
grounded in philosophical analysis, empirical studies and the contemporary 
natural sciences. For a range of purposes utopian speculation may also be 
required, but there may be merit in distinguishing speculative philosophy in 
this utopian sense from speculative philosophy as a program to reconnect a 
wide range of rational inquiries which the twentieth century treated as 
separate, sometimes with harmful consequences. 
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